Corruption in Mexico: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy by Rosenn, Keith S.
CORRUPTION IN MEXICO: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY
Keith S. Rosenn*
INTRODUCTION
Most academicians prefer to ignore corruption,' particularly
when a foreign country is involved. As Gunnar Myrdal explained,
"any attempt by a foreign scholar to deal with the problem of cor-
ruption is bound to present a problem of diplomacy in research."'
Second, virtually no empirical evidence on the extent of corruption
exists. Corruption is deliberately hidden from public view, and the
participants cannot be depended upon to respond honestly to ques-
tionnaires. Third, corruption is a value-laden concept. Certain prac-
tices, such as employing one's relatives, trading on inside informa-
tion, or accepting grease payments, which might be regarded as
corrupt in one culture, may be regarded as quite honest in another
culture.3 Fourth, a certain amount of corruption is found in all
countries, be they developed or developing. Casual empiricism indi-
cates that some countries have more corruption than others. How-
ever, with nothing to footnote, academicians have generally left de-
terminations of the degree of corruption to the judgment of tourists
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. Corruption is conventionally defined as the misuse of official position or power for
private gain. See Rosenn, Brazil's Legal Culture: The Jeito Revisited, I FLA. INT'L L. J. 1, 4
(1984); Senturia, Political Corruption, 4 ENCY. Soc. Sci. 448 (1930); Venkatappiah, Office,
Misuse Of, I I INT'L L. ENCY. Soc. Sci. 272 (1968). It is a fairly vague concept that covers a
multitude of sins, such as bribery, accepting or extorting kickbacks and electoral fraud.
What constitutes a "misuse" is often open to dispute, for most societies operate with a sub-
stantial discrepancy between their ideal and actual standards of behavior. For a penetrating
study of the discrepancies between the "myth system" and the "operational code," see W.
REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES, AND REFORMS (1979).
2. G. MYRDAL, 2 ASIAN DRAMA 939 (1969).
3. Personalism is a important cultural trait in Latin America. Personal relationships
are often regarded as more important than abstract legal rules. Family and friendship ties
frequently impose upon Latin American bureaucrats a duty to bend the law. In these situa-
tions, rigid adherence to the letter of the law may be regarded as immoral. See Rosenn,
supra note I, at 14-15. Particularly in Mexican culture, the lines between corrupt and non-
corrupt behavior are blurred by long established traditions and cultural values. A. RIDING,
DISTANT NEIGHBORS 113-14, 239 (1985). There is much wisdom in Octavio Paz's insight
that North Americans consider the world to be something that can be perfected, and we
[Mexicans] consider it to be something that can be redeemed." 0. PAZ THE LABYRINTH OF
SOLITUDE: LIFE AND THOUGHT IN MEXICO 24 (1961).
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and journalists.
I. GOING PUBLIC WITH CORRUPTION CHARGES
In the past two years U.S.-Mexican relations have been sorely
strained by public accusations in the United States that the Mexi-
can government is corrupt from top to bottom. These accusations
have come from syndicated columnist Jack Anderson and an odd
assortment of U.S. officials." Predictably, Mexican reaction to these
charges has been a combination of outrage and bafflement. The
outrage stems from the perception that going public with such
charges signifies U.S. intermeddling in Mexican domestic affairs
and seriously undermines President de la Madrid's position at
home. The bafflement stems from de la Madrid's natural ques-
tion-"Why me?" Miguel de la Madrid is the most pro-U.S. Mexi-
can President in many years.' Moreover, he has launched the most
visible anti-corruption campaign in Mexican history. The theme of
'"moral renovation" was a main plank in his presidential campaign.
Upon taking office in 1982, he implemented a series of measures to
reduce graft and corruption. These included Mexico's first compre-
hensive conflict of interest legislation, strict control of government
expense accounts, a requirement that officials declare their net
worth upon entering and leaving office, a ban on nepotism, and es-
tablishment of the office of Comptroller General to supervise the
anti-corruption campaign.' The campaign has resulted in the im-
prisonment of a number of important former government officials.7
In May 1984, Jack Anderson fired the first salvos in the corrup-
tion barrage with two syndicated columns, published to coincide
4. In 1983, Flavio Tavares denounced flagrant corruption by Mexican officials in the
Estado de Sao Paulo, one of Brazil's leading newspapers. Tavares, The Shame of Mexico:
Corruption and Mismanagement Amid a Sea of Oil, 30 WORLD PRESS REV. 26-28 (Aug.
1983).
5. M.I.T. Professor Peter Smith made this point even more emphatically, stating: "It is
my judgment that . . . the Reagan administration could not possibly hope for a more conge-
nial and cooperative government in Mexico than that of Miguel de la Madrid." Smith, U.S.-
Mexican Relations: The 1980s and Beyond, 27 J. INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 91, 96
(Feb. 1985).
6. A. RIDING, supra note 3, at 115, 118-119, 131-33; Schuster, Mexico's President
Vows to Clean up Corruption, but Prosecution of Former Leaders Unlikely, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 21, 1983, at 60.
7. These include Jorge Diaz Serrano, former head of Petroleos Mexicanos; Arturo
Durazo Moreno, former chief of police of Mexico City; and Fausto Cantu, former head of
the Mexican Coffee Institute, as well as a former state governor and the former heads of the
National Sugar Industry Commission, the National Indian Affairs Institute, the federal air-
port administration agency, and a state-owned fish marketing firm. See Mexico is Engaged
in Battle against Entrenched Corruption. Washington Post, May 29, 1984, at A12.
[Vol. 18
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 1 [2015], Art. 14
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol18/iss1/14
FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY
with President de la Madrid's official visit to Washington. On May
14 Anderson asserted that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
long concerned that corruption in Mexico is so rife that it may lead
to another revolution, has been monitoring bank transfers of Mexi-
can officials. According to Anderson, classified CIA documents re-
vealed that Echeverria made off with between $300 million and $1
billion during his tenure as President of Mexico. His successor, Lo-
pez Portillo, increased the presidential take to somewhere between
$1 billion and $3 billion." The following day Anderson alleged that
classified U.S. intelligence documents showed the President de la
Madrid had thus far salted away $162 million in foreign bank ac-
counts.9 These columns so outraged the Mexican government that
it lodged a formal protest with the State Department, demanding
that it deny the existence of Anderson's sources. The State Depart-
ment responded with an artfully worded quasi-apology making no
such denial. Then the State Department applauded President de la
Madrid's commitment to addressing the issue of honesty in govern-
ment and concluded: "All information available to all United
States government agencies leads us to the firm conclusion that de
la Madrid has set both a high personal and official standard in
keeping with this commitment.""0 Anderson responded: "We don't
invent figures. The information in my column came from actual
bank transfers monitored by intelligence agencies."" In a later col-
umn, Anderson alleged that a secret study commissioned by Lopez
Portillo himself estimated the total rake-off during his administra-
tion at $44 billion: $14 billion was deposited in foreign banks, and
$30 billion was invested in U.S. real estate. 2 If these figures are
anywhere close to being realistic, nearly half of Mexico's $97 bil-
lion foreign debt disappeared down the drain of corruption in the
six years of Lopez Portillo's presidency.
Anderson's explanation for the CIA's monitoring of Mexican
graft echoed the testimony of General Paul Gorman, chief of the
U.S. command in Panama. In 1984, Gorman told a U.S. Senate
Committee that Mexico had the most corrupt government in Cen-
8. Mexican Wheels Are Lubricated by Official Oil, Washington Post, May 14, 1984,
at BII.
9. Mexico Makes its Presidents Millionaires, Washington Post, May 15, 1984, at
CI5.
10. Mexicans File Protest against Press Report on Leader's Finances, Washington
Post, May 29, 1984, at A]2.
I. Id.
12. Mexico's Riches Were Devoured by Ex President, Washington Post, June 18,
1984, at B12.
1987]
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tral America and predicted that within ten years, Mexico will be
the number one security problem of the United States."3
Two years later, the corruption wound was reopened by a series
of accusations made by Reagan administration officials testifying
before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere affairs. In May 1986, U.S. Customs Commissioner
William von Raab testified that "[a]t the heart of [the drug traf-
ficking problem], in my personal opinion, is just the ingrained cor-
ruption in the Mexican law enforcement establishment."" To the
question "How much corruption exists in the police force?," Von
Raab replied:
My response would be just one word-"massive."..... It exists all
the way up and down the ladder. The only developments of any
consequence over the past few years is that chain of distribution
of "mordida" is sort of going in both directions now .... Now
there are absolute large payments being made at very high levels
of the police-and by the police, I include all sworn officers in the
Mexican law enforcement establishment. 5
He also testified that the Governor of Sonora owned four marijuana
and opium producing ranches, under the protection of the Federal
Judicial Police and the Army. 6 When asked by Senator Murkow-
ski if he had any information about any of President de la Madrid's
relatives being involved in drug trafficking, however, Von Raab in-
dicated that he could not comment on that subject in a public
hearing. 7
Von Raab's testimony was bolstered by William Logan, U.S.
Customs Regional Commissioner for the Southwest. Logan re-
ported that the Mexican Federal Judicial Police and the Federal
Security Police were directly involved in drug smuggling, often es-
corting drug convoys from the interior of Mexico to the U.S.
border."
Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
13. A. RIDING, supra note 3, at 327.
14. Situation in Mexico. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Af-
fairs of the Senate Comm. on For. Relations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1986) [hereinafter
Hearings].
15. Id. at 29.
16. Id. at 36.
17. Id. at 31. Former Ambassador Gavin similarly declined Senator Helms' request to
confirm or deny a CBS report that Florentino Venture, head of the Judicial Police, and
Edmundo de la Madrid, a cousin of the President, were involved in drug trafficking. Id. at
95.
18. Id. at 10-11.
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Affairs, testifying in somewhat more cautious terms, suggested that
corruption was undermining Mexican political stability:
The drug trade poses a long-term threat to the political stability
and social health of Mexican society .... President de la Madrid,
Attorney General Garcia, and many other Mexican officials un-
derstand this. Some Mexican officials at lower levels, however,
have been corrupted by the vast sums of money available to the
traffickers, including many officials supposedly engaged in an-
tinarcotic efforts. 19
In response to Senator Trible's question as to whether the President
of Mexico has the will and capability to tackle the widespread cor-
ruption and drug trafficking, Abrams replied:
President de la Madrid does not have the ability, as President
Reagan does, to push a number of buttons because behind some
of the buttons that you would want to push from the Presidential
Palace in Mexico City, you will find corruption. You will find
people who do not want to carry out those orders."0
On the other hand, when Senator Helms asked him to agree "that
corruption reaches into almost the highest levels of Mexico,"
Abrams diplomatically declined:
I think I probably would disagree with that in the sense that I
believe that at the highest levels, that is to say the President and
the Cabinet, I don't know of such evidence. I think we have seen
with President de la Madrid and Attorney General Garcia a tre-
mendous willingness to cooperate with us on these issues.21
Predictably, the Mexicans were again outraged at these public
attacks. Mexican newspapers reacted with angry headlines, and the
streets of Mexico City were filled with marchers protesting the ver-
bal invasion of national sovereignty by U.S. officials. 2 An official
protest was filed with the State Department, strongly rejecting the
accusations as an unfriendly intervention into Mexico's internal af-
fairs and "a clear and unacceptable violation of Mexico's sover-
eignty."'2 3 U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese attempted to mol-
lify Mexicans' ire by telephoning his counterpart, Sergio Garcia
Ramirez, to apologize for the testimony of Administration officials.
19. Id. at 4-5.
20. Id. at 26.
21. Id. at 26-27.
22. Mexico Reacts with Anger to U.S. Charges, Washington Post, June 1, 1986, at
A23.
23. Mexico Strongly Protests Corruption Allegations, Washington Post, May 16,
1986, at A30.
19871
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Meese reportedly stated that the Senate testimony of government
officials did not reflect the views of the President, Justice Depart-
ment or the U.S. government.24
Meese's face-saving explanation may have smoothed some ruffled
feathers, but resumption of the hearings of the Senate Subcommit-
tee in June 1986 once again aggravated the tensions between the
two countries. Recently retired U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, John
Gavin, stated that at least two Mexican governors, whom he de-
clined to name, "are up to their.elbows in the drug trade."25 On the
other hand, he took the occasion to try to clear the name of Sonora
Governor, Felix Valdez, whom he believed innocent of Raab's drug
cultivation charges.2 6
The most damaging testimony came from Senator Jesse Helms,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, who questioned the legitimacy of
President de la Madrid's electoral mandate. Charging that the po-
litical power of the ruling party, the Partido Revolucionario Institu-
cional (PRI), "is to a great extent tied directly into the system of
graft and corruption," Helms accused the PRI of keeping two sets
of election returns, one "official" and the other "real." According to
Helms, the real election results, secretly compiled by the Presi-
dent's Military Chief of Staff (EMP),27 showed that in the 1982
elections President de la Madrid received only 39.78 percent of the
ballots, rather than the 71.24 percent claimed in the official results.
During the 1985 elections, the secret tabulations revealed that the
PRI and its allies received only 48.02 percent of the votes, rather
than the 71.10 percent claimed officially by the PRI. Helms con-
cluded: "I just have to believe that this is a scandal sufficient to
impeach the legitimacy of the government."2 8 Helms adduced no
additional evidence or witnesses to authenticate his version of the
true election returns. His charges were, of course, immediately de-
nied by the Mexican government.
There is good reason to disbelieve the Mexican government's de-
24. U.S. Reverses its Criticism of Mexico, Washington Post, May 24, 1987, at Al.
25. Hearings supra note 14, at 94.
26. Id. Senator Helms responded that he had probably inadvertently caused confusion
in his question to von Rabb by referring to the State of Sonora when he meant Sinaloa. Id.
at 94-95. Bruce Babbitt, Governor of the State of Arizona, also testified to the good charac-
ter of Sonora governor Felix Valdes and suggested that he had been unfairly maligned by
Von Raab's remarks. Id. at 99-100.
27. These tabulations published in the Appendix to the Committee Report. Id. at 173-
74.
28. Id. at 43. See also, Mexican Chiefs Election Fraudulent, Helms Says, Washing-
ton Post, June 18. 1986, at A21.
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nial. Electoral fraud has been so blatant and widespread in Mexico
in recent years that virtually no disinterested observers of the Mexi-
can political scene believe that the vote count is honest. Yet one
should also be skeptical of Helms' statistics about the extent of the
fraud. Prior to Helms' bombshell reliable estimates of what Mexi-
can election results would have been without fraud were considered
impossible to obtain. Estimates by independent analysts and opposi-
tion parties had generally placed the amount of fraudulent favor of
the PRI in the 1985 congressional elections at about nine percent.29
If these estimates are accurate, the PRI's share of the actual vote
would have been about 56%, about 8% greater than Helm's figure.
Given the wide margin of error inherent in these estimates, Helms
could be right with respect to the 1985 elections. On the other
hand, no serious political commentators have suggested that Presi-
dent de la Madrid did not receive a majority of the votes cast in the
1982 election.
In August 1986 Reagan met with de la Madrid and agreed to
cooperate in resolving Mexico's economic problems and in combat-
ting the drug trade. Hopefully, this meeting has reduced some of
the ill will engendered by these sharp attacks on the de la Madrid
regime.30
II. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF WIELDING THE CORRUPTION
CLUB
To the extent that there is any coherent policy decision to attack
publicly Mexico's corruption problem, it probably reflects five con-
cerns within the Reagan Administration: (1) the frustration with
respect to Mexico's impotence to stem the drug traffic; (2) the sus-
picion that Mexican police participated in the abduction, torture
and murder of Enrique Camerena, a U.S. law enforcement official,
coupled with Mexico's apparent inability to punish those responsi-
ble; (3) the concern that the Mexican government may eventually
be toppled because of popular discontent over the high levels of cor-
ruption; (4) a desire to punish Mexico for its left-leaning policy in
Central America; and (5) a hope that bashing Mexican officials
with the corruption club will effect a decrease in corruption. As a
technique for conducting foreign policy, I submit that allowing U.S.
29. Castenada, Mexico at the Brink, 64 FOR. AFF. 287, 290-91 (Winter 1985/86).
30. Reagan and de la Madrid Vow Cooperation on Drug, Economic Problems, Wash-
ington Post, Aug. 14, 1986, at AI 5.
1987]
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officials to make public accusations of corruption against Mexican
officials is badly misguided and counter-productive.
Social scientists have often observed that corruption is rampant
in Mexico. 8' Mexicans do not deny that it is rampant. Both Lopez
Portillo and de la Madrid have labelled corruption a "cancer" of
Mexican society. Despite de la Madrid's Herculean efforts to
cleanse the Augean stable, corruption remains deeply entrenched in
Mexican society. The most blatant aspect, the mordida, or bribe,
extracted or extorted by Mexican police at every available opportu-
nity, is built into the salary structure of the police force.3 2 Provid-
ing government jobs for friends and relatives is a moral obligation
built into the social structure. Additionally, engaging in business
transactions when one has a clear conflict of interest has tradition-
ally not been deemed to be dishonest behavior for a public official.
Most, though by no means all,33 of the corruption is undesirable.
Resources are frequently misallocated when the criterion is the pri-
vate gain of the allocator. Procurement and construction contracts
become more costly, and the goods received are frequently shoddy.
The government's power to redistribute income, stimulate desired
behavior, or discourage undesired behavior is severely limited by
corruption. As Gunnar Myrdal has pointed out, "Corruption in-
troduces an element of irrationality in plan fulfillment by influenc-
ing the actual course of development in a way that is contrary to
the plan or, if such influence is foreseen, by limiting the horizon of
31. See e.g., F. BRANDENBURG, THE MAKING OF MODERN MEXICO 162 (1964); M.
GRINDLE, BUREAUCRATS, POLITICIANS, AND PEASANTS IN MEXICO: A CASE STUDY IN PUBLIC
POLICY 43-44 (1977); R. HANSEN, THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN DEVELOPMENT 124-27 (1971);
K. JOHNSON, MEXICAN DEMOCRACY: A CRITICAL VIEW 32-34, 185-96 (3d ed. 1984); L.
MENDIETA Y NUNEZ, LA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA EN MEXICO (1942); M. NEEDLER,
MEXICAN POLITICS: THE CONTAINMENT OF CONFLICT 60-62, 132 (1982); R. VERNON, THE
DILEMMA OF MEXICO'S DEVELOPMENT 151-53 (1963); H. WRIGHT, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN
MEXICO 19-21 (1970); HELFELD, Law and Politics in Mexico, in ONE SPARK FROM HOLO-
CAUST: THE CRISIS IN LATIN AMERICA, 81, 91 (E. Burnell ed. 1972).
32. In 1981, 244 traffic policemen in Mexico City signed a complaint alleging that
their superiors extorted money from them by charging them for items theoretically furnished
gratuitously. The policemen charged that they were forced to pay 15,000 pesos for the use of
a department motorcycle, 4,000 pesos for a uniform, and 1,500 pesos for a ticket book and
revolver. They were also required to pay 50 peso a day to their chief inspectors. To support
these levies, the police claimed they were obliged to extort money from the general public.
Tavares, supra note 4, at 27.
33. A number of social scientists have pointed out that under certain circumstances
corruption can promote economic and administrative efficiency. See, e.g., Leff, Economic
Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption, 8 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 11-12 (Nov. 1964);
Leys, What is the Problem About Corruption? 3 J. MODERN AFRICAN STUD. 218 (1965);
Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
417 (1967); Wilson, Corruption Is Not Always Scandalous, N.Y. Times Magazine, Apr. 28,
1968.
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the plan. 4 Corruption also retards administrative efficiency, deters
much needed investment, causes capital flight, and undermines gov-
ernmental credibility.
Nevertheless, total elimination of corruption would probably
badly destabilize the Mexican government. As Alan Riding has ob-
served, "Corruption is essential to the operation and survival of the
political system .. . . [T]he system has in fact never lived without
corruption and it would disintegrate or change beyond recognition
if it tried to do so.''35 Corruption is the glue that holds together the
political alliances that have enabled Mexico to enjoy social peace.
It purchases tranquil labor relations. It avoids harsh press criticism
of governmental policies. It allows Mexico to avoid the bane of
other Latin American countries, the military golpe or coup d'etat.
It enables the government to co-opt potential enemies successfully.
It ensures the redistribution of income because the regime changes
every six years, providing hope for those presently excluded that
they may enrich themselves after future elections. Few challenged
corruption for fear of rocking the boat or being investigated for tax
evasion. Corruption is the lubricant that enables the wheels of the
bloated bureaucracy to turn. Were it not for this grease, the bu-
reaucracy would have ground to a halt long ago.
Second, the practice of public Mexico-bashing displays disdain
and disregard for Mexican sensibilities. Such behavior from U.S.
officials shows a failure to give due respect to the government of a
friendly neighboring state. More importantly, from a Latin Ameri-
can perspective, the United States has committed the cardinal sin
of depriving Mexican officials of dignidad, thereby creating ene-
mies where we need friends.
Third, this kind of criticism implies an air of moral superiority
that the United States can ill afford to assume. In light of a long
list of recent U.S. government scandals, such as Watergate, Ab-
scam, and now the Iran-Contra affair, the pot appears to be calling
the kettle black."
It is by no means clear that any Mexican administration has the
power to eliminate corruption. It has now become the practice of
Mexican presidents to begin their terms with anticorruption cam-
34. G. MYRDAL. supra note 2, at 952.
35. A. RIDING, supra note 3, at 113.
36. With respect to our past, the observation made by Peter Odegard in 1930 is worth
recalling: "Among the great modern nations the United States has had perhaps the least
enviable reputation as regards the probity of its political life." Odegard, Corruption, Politi-
cal, 4 ENCY. SoC. ScI. 452 (1930).
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paigns aimed at reducing corruption to more tolerable levels, rather
than eliminating it entirely. The budgetary ramifications of paying
civil servants decent salaries or finding alternative employment for
the thousands of unneeded civil servants are staggering. Also, the
risk of upsetting the delicate balance of political forces that has
enabled the PRI to remain in power for some sixty years is
substantial.
III. THE RISK TO MEXICO OF ALLOWING HIGH LEVELS OF
CORRUPTION TO CONTINUE
On the other hand, corruption during the heady days of the oil
bonanza reached such high levels that it has the potential for seri-
ously destabilizing the Mexican government. To a large degree, the
PRI's political legitimacy has come from economic growth and the
maintenance of domestic tranquility. With popular discontent rising
steadily in the wake of the forced contraction of the economy, the
regime feels increasing pressure to resort to more blatant electoral
fraud. Those in positions of authority also feel increasing pressure
to maintain their standard of living by increasing their bribe prices.
Such measures aggravate popular discontent, forcing the govern-
ment to rely heavily on military repression, as it did in 1968. But,
the more one relies on the military to maintain domestic peace, the
more likely the military is to seize power itself.37 In addition, the
more one relies upon repression to retain political power, the more
likely the repressed are to revolt. The real risk is that Mexico's
much envied coup-immune system may be insidiously breaking
down. If it does, Mexico will become a prime security problem for
the United States.
37. See J. FITCH, THE MILITARY Coup D'ETAT AS A POLITICAL PROCESS 7 (1977).
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